Alliances often face both free-riding and hold-up problems, which undermine the e¤ectiveness of alliances in mobilizing joint …ghting e¤ort. Despite of these disadvantages, alliances are still ubiquitous in all types of contests. This paper asks if there are non-monetary incentives to form alliances, e.g., intimidating/discouraging the single player(s) who is/are left alone. For this purpose, I compare symmetric (2 vs. 2) and asymmetric (2 vs. 1) contests to their equivalent 4-player and 3-player individual contests, respectively.
Introduction
The distribution of resources in the world more or less resembles the nature of "contest" in economic theory. Namely, a group of players, whether individuals, enterprises, interest groups, or countries, expend costly e¤ort to compete for some common prize(s). Examples of their competitive interactions range from individual beauty or sport contests to wars and military contests among countries. Tullock (1967) was the …rst to formalize contests in a rent-seeking environment, and subsequent theories in this …eld have developed along di¤erent dimensions and been applied in various contexts.
1 Furthermore, when there are more than two players in a contest, alliances which allow members to pool their resources in the …ght against common adversaries, are often observed in wars, political elections, rent-seeking activities, patent races, etc. Despite of the pervasiveness of alliances in practice, doubts have persisted about its success and e¤ectiveness. For example, Olson (1965) and Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) point out that the typical collective action problem gives alliance members strong incentives to free-ride on other members' e¤ort, and free-riding problems become more severe as the number of alliance players increases. Therefore, Olson (1965) suggests that small groups are actually more e¤ective and more likely to win the contests (i.e., the so-called "paradox of group size"). This paradox has been proven in some speci…c contexts (e.g., Tullock 1980; Katz and Tokatlidu 1996; Baik and Lee 1997) , but not necessarily in others (Chamberlin 1974; Mac Guire 1974; Sandler 1993; Esteban and Ray 1999; 2001) .
More recent studies focus on endogenous alliance formation rather than exogenously changing the size of contest groups. In a three-player model, Skaperdas (1998) and Esteban and SÃ ¾ akovics (2003) show that individual players have no incentive to form a two-player alliance, not only because of the free-riding problem, but also because they perceive the possibility of future internal con ‡ict among alliance players who must share the prize after defeating their adversaries. The sharing process might ex ante attempt to be peaceful, but no guarantee ensures it would be. In that case, a subsequent contest may take place to determine the …nal winner among the victorious alliance, a process that involves further costly e¤ort and reduces the expected payo¤ for alliance players. Therefore, anticipation of future con ‡ict further reduces the alliance members'incentive to expend e¤ort in the inter-alliance contest and, consequently, its winning probability and expected payo¤. The widely observed practice of alliance formation, even in the face of these two major disadvantages, constitute the "paradox of alliance formation" (Konrad 2009 ). However, in more complex settings in which players are asymmetric and budget constrained or possess complementary resources that increase the alliance's capability (Konrad and Kovenock 2009; Skaperdas 1998) , stable alliance formation might emerge endogenously in equilibrium (for a review, see Bloch 2009 ).
Instead of looking for the missing factors that might resolve the alliance formation paradox in theory, I aim to understand the paradox in the original setup using experimental methods. In particular, I study whether simply being in an alliance has an impact on the behavior of alliance members and/or stand-alone players, especially when alliance formation makes the competing parties asymmetric (in terms of the number of players in each party). There has being long-standing discussions in psychology about human's need to belong, especially when others are in groups. 2 The formation of the alliance could bene…t the alliance players by intimidating the more lonesome individual players, if there is indeed the need to belong. 3 Recent experiments in economics also show that people behave differently when they are in groups versus alone in both strategic and non-strategic situations (Charness et al. 2007; Sutter 2009 ). 4 Whether and how potential behavioral or psychological factors in ‡uence the contest behavior of players both within and outside the alliance, could have strong impacts on the attractiveness of alliance formation. The experiment reported herein aims to better understand these hypotheses. In order to study the pure framing e¤ects of alliances, the sharing rule between the allaince members has to chosen such that there is no monetary incentive/disincentive of being in an alliance. Egalitarian (or equal) sharing rule and merit (or proportionalsharing) rule are the most commonly used versions in prior literature. Under the egalitarian/equal sharing rule, members of the alliance receive equal shares of the prize, irrespective of how much they have contributed in the inter-alliance contest, so a free-riding problem arises. In the merit rule, members share the prize according to their relative contributions to the inter-alliance contest, and the free-riding problem is fully eliminated. 5 Players should be equally incentivized, irrespective of being in an alliance or not, and thus be indi¤erent between competing individually or forming an alliance. 6 Therefore, comparing contest behavior with alliances to its equavilent individual contests provides a natural way to study whether there is a pure framing e¤ect of being in an alliance. The experiment consists of three treatments. In the base treatment, three individual players each decide independently the e¤ort they will expend in a contest, and a lottery wheel draws the winner afterwards, according to a standard Tullock lottery contest success function (i.e., the winning probability of each player is determined by the ratio of their e¤ort to the total e¤ort of all three players). In two experimental (alliance) treatments, two players enter an alliance to contest the third player. The winning probability for the third player stays the same, but the alliance's winning probability is equal to the ratio of alliance players'joint e¤ort over the total e¤ort of all three players. I call this scenario an inter-alliance contest, hereafter though the third player is only in an alliance with him-or herself.
5 Alliance players can always break up and engage in a sub-contest after victory, so these peaceful sharing solutions may not be enforceable, which demands consideration of the subcontest sharing rule. In a previous paper, Ke et al. (2010) compare the equal sharing and sub-contest sharing rules to identify the size of the hold-up problem in an inter-alliance contest, induced by the further dissipative intra-alliance contest. In this study I deliberately choose the proportional sharing rule to eliminate both the free-riding problem and the hold-up problem (induced by the threat of potential internal con ‡ict).
6 Another rule broadly discussed in theory uses convex combinations of both equal sharing and proportional sharing. Taking the combined ratio as an exogenous choice, Nitzan (1991a Nitzan ( , 1991b , Davis and Reilly (1999) , and Ueda (2002) study how equilibrium e¤ort changes with this ratio. Lee (1995) , Baik and Shogren (1995) , Baik and Lee (1997 ), and Noh (1999 further endogenize the sharing rule and …nd that alliances of symmetric group size choose the proportional sharing rule, even though they would be better o¤ if everyone chose equal sharing rule. In reality, both equal and proportional sharing rules have disadvantages. Although the proportional rule eliminates free-riding, it can be very costly or even infeasible to enforce when e¤ort can not be monitored easily.
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The di¤erence between the two alliance-treatments pertains to the sharing rule implementation stage. In the …rst alliance treatment, after defeating the standalone player, one alliance player is randomly drawn as the …nal and sole winner of the prize. The winning probability of an alliance player (conditional on a joint victory) is equal to the proportion of the e¤ort he or she contributes to the total e¤ort by the alliance. 7 Compared with that in the base treatment, the winning probability for each individual alliance player in this treatment is essentially the same (for given e¤ort choices). In addition, the winner always gets the full prize in both treatments. Therefore, alliance formation does not change the problem facing each individual player, and the equilibrium predictions should be identical to those in the base treatment. The equivalence holds even if I abstract away from the risk-neutrality assumption, as is often used in contest theories. Therefore, this design provides the minimum alliance framing possible to identify the psychological impact of alliance formation. However, in this treatment alliances are somewhat "temporary", because they eventually break up following inter-alliance contests when the spoils of the alliances's victory are not shared. The prospect that only one of the two alliances players receives the full prize might signi…cantly weaken the tie between alliance members. The perception of tie strenghth between the alliance players thus might in ‡uence e¤ort choices by the players. Instead of drawing one winner from the victorious alliance, in the second alliance-treatment, the prize is shared between the two alliance players. Sharing the fruit of a joint victory should strengthen their tie and make the alliance manipulation more salient. However, it is still comparable to the other two treatments, because the alliance player still receives a share of the prize that is in proportion to the e¤ort he or she contributed to the total e¤ort of the alliance. For a risk-neutral, expected-payo¤ maximizer, the equilibrium predictions are the same as in the other two treatments. Therefore, deviations in this treatment should indicate how the improved saliency of the alliance feature a¤ects e¤ort choices in inter-alliance contests. Furthermore, it is possible to identify (or eliminate) other potential behavioral factors (e.g., changing risk preference, the need to belong, joy of winning, group spirit) that could a¤ect the attractiveness of alliance formation through treatment comparison.
This study thereby o¤ers two major …ndings. First, alliance formation has a signi…cant impact on stand-alone players'e¤ort choice even if the alliance is only temporary. When the contest is asymmetric (2 versus 1), the stand-alone player are more likely to drop out or greatly reduce e¤ort, which con…rms that the need to belong creats psychological disadvantages for lonesome players in the contest when others are in a group. Second, risk attitudes seem stable, and players do not play more aggressively in groups. On the contrary, they expend similar e¤ort in temporary alliances but signi…cantly less e¤ort in permanent alliances, compared with individual contests. This result is consistent with the predictions derived from a simple model that takes the non-monetary utility of winning into consideration. In summary, if alliance members can agree on a sharing rule, such that the free-riding problem can be eliminated and peaceful sharing is ensured, alliance formation can bene…t members both inside and outside the alliance (especially alliance players) via reduced over-dissipation.
This study also relates to a wide range of experimental studies related to contests. First, experimental tests of contest theories often focus on one-stage contests (Millner and Pratt 1989; Shogren and Baik 1991; Davis and Reilly 1998; Potters et al. 1998; Anderson and Sta¤ord 2003) or multi-stage contests (Schmitt et al. 2004; Parco et al. 2005; Sheremeta 2010 ) and reveal that people expend much more e¤ort than what would be predicted in equilibrium.
8 Similar to these studies, I …nd over-dissipation is the rule in this experiment. Second, in literature that investigates group contests, Ahn et al. (2011) compare individualindividual contests, group-group contests, and individual-group contests, …nding over-dissipation in all of them such that they reject "the paradox of group size" proposed by Olson (1965) . Sheremeta and Zhang (2010) compare e¤ort choices in individual contests to those in group contests (with intra-group communica-tion and joint decision-making) and …nd that group-chosen e¤orts are much lower than individual e¤ort, which they explain by asserting that groups are more riskaverse than individuals. Sutter and Strassmair (2009) study how intra and/or inter-group communication a¤ect e¤ort levels in group contests (with individually chosen e¤ort); intra-group communication increases contest e¤ort, whereas intergroup communication facilitates collusion and reduces contest e¤ort. Abbink et al. (2010) further study the e¤ect of intra-group punishment on inter-group contests and …nd that allowing punishment greatly increases the dissipation rate. In all these studies, the prize is either non-rivalous among group members or shared equally. The only experimental studies, to the best of my knowledge, that involve the proportional sharing rule are Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006) and Kugler et al. (2010) . However, instead of comparing contest behavior in groups than in individuals, they study the public goods problem embedded in group contests and focus on comparisons of the impact of two di¤erent sharing rules (equal vs. proportional).
To establish the …ndings and extended of this study, I begin in Section 2 by explaining the experimental design and implementation. In Section 3, I report the experimental results, followed by a conclusion in Section 4.
Experiment
The experiment is based a standard Tullock (1980) lottery contest. Imagine that there are three players, A, B and C, who must expend costly e¤ort to win a …xed prize value (V = 450).
9 In a baseline treatment (T1), each player simultaneously and independently chooses an e¤ort level from f0; 1; 2; :::; 250g and compete against one another. A lottery wheel then draws one winner (i) out of the three players, according to the winning probability p i = x i =X; where x i is the e¤ort choice of player i; and X is the total e¤ort of all three players. The winner gets the full prize and pays for his or her e¤ort; and the losers get nothing (yet still need to pay for their own e¤ort). Therefore, the expected payo¤ of each individual player is given by E( i ) = p i V x i . For a risk-neutral, expected-payo¤ maximizer, the optimal 9 The values of all the parameters are given in units of experimental currency.
7 e¤ort choice should be x i = 2 9 V = 100. In equilibrium, each player has a one-third probability to win the prize, and the expected pro…t is 50 for every player. In total, two-thirds of the prize value are dissipated in the contest (in equilibrium).
In two other treatments, all the parameter values remain constant, but players A and B are forced into an alliance. Alliance formation binds the winning probability of the alliance players, such that they either jointly win or jointly lose the contest against player C. Each alliance member still decides the e¤ort he or she expends independently though. Following the same logic, the probability that player C wins the prize stays the same as in T1 (p C = x C =X); and the probability that the alliance players win the contest is p AB = X AB =X (where X AB = x A + x B; is the total e¤ort expended by A and B). Therefore, the probability that an alliance player wins the prize depends not only on his or her own e¤ort but also on the e¤ort of the alliance player. E¤ort is perfectly substitutable between alliance players. If the alliance loses against player C, player C gets the whole prize (450), as in the Base treatment. However, if the alliance players win against player C, the sharing rule between the alliance players di¤ers in two experimental treatments.
In the second treatment, conditional on the alliance winning against player C, another lottery wheel randomly draws one …nal winner between A and B, according to their previous e¤ort choices relative to the total e¤ort expended by A and B together. Speci…cally, the probability that player i (A or B) is the …nal winner, conditional on the victory of the alliance, is given by q i AB = x i =X AB . I name this treatment "Arandom" where A referring to the alliance and random means that the …nal winner in the alliance is randomly decided according to q i AB . Therefore, for each alliance player, the expected payo¤ is calculated as
The alliance formation according to this random-proportional rule does not change the nature of the problem compared with the Base treatment, because the joint probability that the alliance wins and (at the same time) that this player is drawn as the …nal winner (i.e., p AB q
) is identical to p i in the Base treatment. As Table 1 shows, the equilibrium e¤orts, expected pro…ts, and total rate of dissipation remain unchanged. This equivalence holds even if players are not risk-neutral. 10 The comparison between Arandom and Base allows us to test the pure framing e¤ect of alliance formation, such as when people become more or less competitive as the institutional organization of the competition changes. Similar to the Arandom treatment, A and B again are forced into an alliance in the third treatment. However, in case of a victory, alliance players A and B share the prize in proportion to what they have contributed in the contest against player C. I name this treatment "Aproportion". Let s i AB be the share of the prize that i gets, so the alliance players'expected payo¤ is determined by
Although both q i AB and s i AB are equal to x i =X AB , the former indicates a conditional winning probability, the latter represents the proportion of the prize. For given e¤ort choices, alliance players in Arandom treatments face a lower winning probability for a higher prize, whereas those in Aproportion have a higher winning probability for a lower prize. However, because the expected values of the two lotteries are the same, the expected-payo¤ maximizing equilibrium e¤ort should be identical in all three treatments (see Table 1 ). The ex post outcome is very di¤erent in Aproportion and Arandom treatment though. The tiny change from Arandom to Aproportion strengthens the tie between the alliance players and makes the alliance manipulation more salient. This manipulation enables me to test if increasing the saliency of alliance features (without changing the expected payo¤) further in ‡uences the contest behavior of both alliance players and individual players.
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The experiment was run in the MELESSA laboratory at the University of Munich. The participants were recruited and included students from all …elds.
12
Each of the 216 total participants undewent 24 rounds of the same treatment and kept their individual role as player A, B, or C throughout all rounds. Anonymity between subjects was preserved throughout the experiment, and the payment procedure ensured that the laboratory sta¤ could not link individual behavior the case in this experiment.
11 Heterogeneous risk preference, misperception of winning probabilities, and joy of winning might explain over-dissipation in contests, which could also drive di¤erent behavior in Aproportion and Arandom treatments. Other psychological motivations or certain social preferences might play roles as well. Identifying the impact of each of these factors is interesting but beyond the scope of this paper. As a …rst step, this study is mainly explorative. Narrowing down the potential candidate set based on the experimental results is possible, as I detail in the next section.
12 The participants were recruited using ORSEE software (Greiner 2004) . The experiment was programmed using Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007 to the individual students. During the experiments, students were divided sixperson groups and re-matched within these groups in each round to eliminate quasi-repeated games e¤ects. The precise division of the subgroups was not explained to the participants during the experiment; rather, they knew only that they would be randomly rematched with other players in each round and could play with and/or against di¤erent people in di¤erent rounds. 13 The instructions were provided and also read to them by the laboratory sta¤, and an entry quiz guided them through the experiment to ensure proper understanding. In addition of a participation fee of EUR 4, they received a …xed payment of EUR 0:6, for each round played. 14 To reduce possible e¤ects of good or bad luck in earlier rounds, subjects were paid according to their decisions and outcomes in 6 random rounds out of 24, at the end of the experiment. The average earnings per subject were EUR 20 in total. Before …nishing the session, participants answered an exit questionnaire. The time for sessions in all treatments was very similar and took roughly 1.5 hours.
Results
Contrary to standard theoretical predictions, alliance players expend less e¤ort (compared with a contest without alliances in the Base treatment) when the prize is shared between the two alliance players. However, when there is only one …nal winner in the alliance, alliance players behave the same as if there were no alliance. Alliance formation intimidates stand-alone players (especially women), such that more single players expend very little e¤ort or no e¤ort when they confront one united "stronger" opponent rather than two single and symmetric opponents. In this section, I establish these results by …rst presenting the summary statistics and then examining individual behavior.
Treatment e¤ects
Figure 1: Average e¤ort by treatment, period and player.
In Figure 1 , I depict the average e¤ort for every three periods in each treatment.
The solid line with circles illustrates the average e¤ort for all three players in the Base treatment. Players expend around 150 units on average in the Base treatment, which is 50% higher than the equilibrium prediction. This result is in line with the results in previous experimental contests. To examine the impact of alliance formation, I plot the average e¤ort for alliance players and single players separately in the Arandom and Aproportion treatments. Compared with the Base treatment, alliance players in Arandom expend similar e¤ort -148 units on average (see the dotted line with circles). However, the average e¤ort expended by player C in Arandom is much lower (116), as also shown in Figure 1 by the dotted line with triangles for player C, which is much lower than the solid line, especially in later periods. When the prize is shared proportionally between the alliance players, the deviation from the Base treatment reverses. The alliance players in the Aproportion treatment invest signi…cantly less e¤ort than players in the Base treatment, or 127 units on average (dashed line with circles), whereas the average e¤ort expended by player C (145 units on average) is not much di¤erent from that in the Base treatment (dashed lines with triangles for single players and with circles for alliance players in Figure 1 ). To further examine treatment di¤erences at the individual level of the data, I plot histograms of e¤ort choices by player A/B or player C in di¤erent treatments in Figure 2 . First, the e¤ort choices are widely distributed between 0 and 250. Second, the lower panel of the graph, which lists the histograms of alliance players' individual e¤ort, indicates that the two distributions for the Base and the Arandom treatment look almost identical. E¤orts are distributed fairly evenly between 0 to 200, with a spike (of around 40% of the observations) in the range of 200 to 250 in both treatments. However, the spike at the right end disappears in the Aproportion treatment, and more choices shift to the center of the feasible set. Third, single players shift their e¤ort choice, either to left or to right end of the distribution, leaving fewer intermediate e¤orts in the two alliance treatments than in the Base treatment (see the upper panel of Figure 2 ).
In summary, alliance formation seems to a¤ect the e¤ort choices of both alliance players and individual players. The …nding about the alliance players rules out the "group spirits" hypothesis, because these players expend equal or less (rather than more) e¤ort than individual players. Players' risk preference also seem stable, irrespective of whether they play in an alliance or individually, because behavioral shifts from the Base treatment to the Arandom treatment are not observed. 17 Finally, I propose that the reduced e¤ort contribution in the Aproportion treatment can be explained by the joy of winning. Assuming players earn extra non-monetary utility from winning is similar to allowing for an extra prize to the …nal winner(s). This extra non-monetary utility has a public-good nature in the Aproportion treatment but not in the Base or Arandom treatments, because these latter treatments feature one …nal winner. Therefore, alliance formation in Aproportion induces free-riding incentives for the alliance players to gain this extra prize, leading to reduced e¤ort. Although the prediction might be di¤erent depending on whether people gain the same amount of non-monetary utility when they win alone or together with others, or whether the utility varies with the size 17 Sheremeta and Zhang (2010) indicate that groups make less risky decisions than individuals. The major di¤erence between their …nding and my …nding is that there is no communication in my experiment, and decisions are made independently rather than jointly. In other words, simply being in a group does not change players' risk preference, but the interactions between group members might. of the prize, one can at least show that alliance players should reduce their e¤ort and single players should increase their e¤ort in the Aproportion treatment, compared with the Base and Arandom treatments, if the extra utility from winning is the same irrespective of whether the prize is shared, using the simple joy-ofwinning model proposed by Sheremeta (2010) . The detailed solutions are in the Appendix.
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Single players (…ghting against an alliance) might feel lonesome or have less con…dence than they actually should have about winning the contest such that they greatly reduce their e¤ort. Being in a "weaker" position, single players also might perceive winning as a great challenge and thus derive more joy of winning from it, in which case they would …ght very hard. The former type of players should exhibit greater need to belong and lower joy of winning than the latter type. The shifts observed in Figure 2 for player C suggest that both types of players appear in the subject pool. Therefore, an analysis that combines the individual characteristics and e¤ort choices should reveal types of players. Figure 2 shows that individual e¤ort choice is rather heterogeneous. To determin who deviates and in what direction in the alliance treatments, I summarize the e¤ort choice for di¤erent groups of players, according to their individual characteristics (e.g., age, gender, discipline in university study). Neither alliance players' e¤ort choices nor e¤ort choices in the Base treatment depend heavily on these individual traits.
Gender di¤erences among stand-alone players
19 However, when alliance formation leads to group asymmetry (2 versus 1), male and female single players behave di¤erently. To elaborate this point, I present both summary statistics (see Table 3 ) and histograms of single players'e¤orts (in alliance treatments) by gender (see Figure 3) . I again split the data into the …rst and second 12 periods to detect dynamic changes. In Arandom, female players'average e¤ort is 104 units in period 1 to 12 and then falls to 99 in periods 13 to 24; in contrast, however, male players start with very high average e¤ort (176) in the …rst 12 periods and then reduce it to 124 units in the second half of the experiments (see the second and third columns in Table  3 ). This trend corresponds to the individual choices presented in four histograms on the left side of Figure 3 . Almost 60% of choices made by male players are above 200 in periods 1 to 12, but this number drops to around 40% in periods 13 to 24, accompanied by an increase in the choices below 50 from around 10% in periods 1-12 to 35% in periods 13-24. For female players in Arandom, more than 35% of their choices are below 50, and around 30% of the choices are above 200; this distribution does not change signi…cantly in the second half. This di¤erence between male and female single players also indicates that the sharp decline in the average e¤ort time series for player C in the Arandom treatment (Figure 1 ) was caused mainly by the dramatic shifts men made.
In Aproportion, the dynamics are slightly di¤erent. Both male and female players starts with similar e¤ort (157 vs. 148), but then move in opposite directions. Male players'average e¤ort increases to 174, while female players'e¤ort reduces to 126. Looking at the full distributions on the right side of Figure 3 , around 20% of the players (both male and female) expend less than 50, and 50-60% of the players expend more than 200 in the …rst half of the experiment. However, men respond with more extremely high e¤ort (i.e., choices above 200 increase from 60% to 70%) in periods 13 to 24, and womens respond with less extremely high e¤ort (i.e., choices above 200 decrease from 50% to around 35%) but more extremely low e¤ort (i.e., choices below 50 increase from 20% to 30%). These observations suggest that men tend to …ght harder initially when they contest a two-player alliance. However, they also quickly respond to their success or failure. In the Arandom treatment, the joint e¤ort of alliance players is approximately twice that of the single players, so single players often lose the contest. Therefore, male single players soon greatly reduce their e¤ort. In Aproportion, the lower joint e¤ort by the alliance players allows single players to win more often than in the Arandom treatment. As a result, male single players pick the extremely high e¤ort more often in the second half of the experiment. However, female single players are always more likely to drop out or expend less e¤ort in the contest when they face a two-player alliance rather than two individual players.
These results are in line with recent studies on gender di¤erence. Controlling for the ability of men and women, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) …nd that men are twice as likely as women to join a tournament, mainly because of their greater interest in (preference for) for competition and their higher levels of over-con…dence. Furthermore, Healy and Pate (2011) …nd that the gender gap declines by twothirds if competition takes place in two-person teams, irrespective of the gender of one's partner. Potential candidates, such as risk or feedback aversion or con…dence, have been ruled out as major reasons. Instead, women appear not to like competition if they must compete alone, whereas they feel much more comfortable when they have a partner. In summary, these results indicate that women tend to have more intrinsic need to belong to a group and enjoy the joy-of-winning less if they have to …ght alone rather than in a group. 20 
Rent dissipation and social welfare
After examining the e¤ort choice for di¤erent groups of players in di¤erent treatments, I turn to the impact of alliance formation on the total rate of dissipation and individual pro…ts. Table 4 shows that players in Base treatment dissipate more than 100% of the prize (457.2), and this over-dissipation on average leads to negative pro…t ( -2.4 points). Over-dissipation declines when there is alliance formation, such that total dissipation is 411.2 in Arandom and 399.9 in Aproportion, as a result of the lower e¤ort expended by alliance players or single players. Consequently, the average pro…ts of each individual player improve in the two experimental treatments, especially for alliance players. The average payo¤ is highest in the group of alliance players under proportional sharing rules (25 points). Not surprisingly, in a post-experiment questionaire, a majority of respondants indicated that they would have preferred to be in an alliance, had they been given the opportunity to choose. In particular, 65% of the alliance players and 83% of the single players in the Aproportion treatment, and 54% of the alliance players and 58% of the single players in the Arandom treatment, chose "yes"in response to this question. In conclusion, alliance formation can bene…t both alliance players and single players by reducing wasteful resource dissipation in rent-seeking contests.
Conclusion
Alliance formation is often observed in rent-seeking contests, political elections, wars, and so on. However, there are two major disadvantages of alliances: the free-riding problem and the potential threat of internal con ‡ict when it comes to dividing the prize after alliance victory. In this article, I study alliance form- ation with share proportional rules to abstract away from these two potential disadvantages of alliance formation. By comparing e¤ort choices in contests with exogenously formed alliances (with proportional rules) against e¤ort choices in individual contests, I examine whether behavioral factors such as need to belong, group spirits, and joy of winning make the alliance more attractive, even when there is no actual expected monetary gain from alliance formation. People expend less e¤ort if they are in an alliance and share the prize proportionally, compared with when they play in individual contests. However, this e¤ect disappears if the alliance is temporary, such that only one player in the alliance is entitled to the full prize in the end. This …nding is consistent with predictions derived from a simple model that incorporates the non-monetary utility of winning. Moreover, alliance formation has a signi…cant impact on single players, even if the alliance is temporary. Female players are always more likely to be discouraged by the alliance and expend lower e¤ort, whereas male single players initially expend higher e¤ort and soon move in opposite directions depending on whether they win or not. The gender di¤erence in contest behavior suggests that female players have higher need to belong and derive much less non-monetary utility from winning if they must compete individually against a group. Because over-dissipation is a wide-spread phenomenon in contest experiments, both alliance players and stand-alone players bene…t from alliance formation due to reduced over-dissipation.
A A simple joy-of-winning model
In this appendix, I provide a simple theoretical model that takes the non-monetary utility of winning into consideration. Suppose each player gain additional utility w if he or she wins the prize, irrespective of whether the prize is shared with another player or not. The expected-payo¤ functions and their corresponding equilibrium solutions for each treatment are given in the following. In the Base treatment, the expected utility is given by
and the expected-payo¤ maximizing e¤ort choice is given by:
It is trivial to show that the prediction does not change for the Arandom treatment, because the alliance formation in Arandom does not alter the objective function for all players. 21 However, in the Aproportion treatment, both the winning probability and the actual monetary price received di¤ers for the alliance players. Therefore, the new expected payo¤ function is given by:
Consequently, the equilibrium e¤ort choices that solve that …rst-order condition are: 21 An important assumption in this model is that the non-monetary utility of winning (w) is only accompanied by the award of the prize and does not change with the actual prize value received by the players. In particular, in the Arandom treatment, alliance players might win against the single player, but if he or she does not receive the prize after the random-draw within the alliance, he or she does not gain w. This assumption is slightly di¤erent from Sheremeta (2010)'s assumption that players gain non-monetary utility of winning from each stage, irrespective of whether it is the intermediate or the …nal stage. With properly speci…ed values/functions for w, these two di¤erent assumptions can lead to qualitatively equivalent equilibrium outcomes.
A-1
It is easy to prove that x A = x B 22 < x < x C 23 : Therefore, if players substract extra non-monetary utility from winning the prize, alliance players should expend less e¤ort, and single players should expend more e¤ort in Aproportion than in the other two treatments.
B Experimental instructions (for online publication) B.1 Base treatment
Welcome to this experiment! Please read these instructions carefully and completely. Properly understanding the instructions will help you make better decisions and hence earn more money. Your earnings in this experiment will be measured in Talers. At the end of the experiment we will convert the Talers you have earned to cash and pay you in private. For each 45 Talers you earn you will be paid 1 Euro in cash. Therefore, the more Talers you earn, the more cash you will gain at the end of today's experiment. In addition to the Talers earned during the experiment, each participant will receive a show-up fee of 4 Euros.
Please keep in mind that you are not allowed to communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you do not obey this rule you will be asked to leave the laboratory without getting paid. Whenever you have a question, please raise your hand; an experimenter will come to you.
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B.1.1 Your task
This experiment will consist of 24 rounds. Before the actual experiment starts, you will …rst have to answer a few questions related to the experiment. The questions will be presented to you through the computer screen. For the experiment, groups consisting of three people are formed. These groups are randomly composed in each round. Your task in each round is to make some decisions. The money you earn depends on your decision and the decisions of the two other players in your group. Let the three players in one group be called A, B, and C. In each round, three players A, B, and C compete for a prize of 450 Talers. The competition works as follows:
1. In a …rst stage, all players will simultaneously choose "an e¤ort level". Each player decides independently on his or her own e¤ort level. A player's e¤ort is chosen as an integer between 0 and 250, and it corresponds to the amount of Talers the player would like to expend in the competition to win the prize. You will have to pay this amount of Talers to the lab, whether or not you win the competition. In the following, player A's e¤ort is denoted by X A , player B's e¤ort is denoted by X B , and similarly player C's e¤ort is denoted by X C .
2. Then, you will be shown the amount of Talers that the other players in your group have expended. The total expense is equal to the sum of all players' e¤orts:
3. Now a fortune wheel will turn and decide whether player A; or player B; or player C wins the 450-Taler-prize. As you will see, the fortune wheel is divided into three colors -yellow, green, and blue. The yellow color represents the Talers spent by player A (i.e., X A ), the green color represents the Talers spent by player B (i.e., X B ), and the blue color represents the Talers spent by player C (i.e., X C ). The three colored areas on the wheel represent exactly each player's shares in the total expense (i.e., X A + X B + X C ).
4. At the centre of the fortune wheel there is an arrow initially pointing to the top. After some time the arrow starts to rotate and then stops randomly.
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If the arrow stops in the yellow-colored area, player A wins the prize; if the arrow stops in the green-colored area, player B wins the prize; if the arrow stops in the blue-colored area, player C wins the prize. This means that the probability that player A or B or C wins the prize is equal to his or her corresponding share of the e¤ort in the total expense, hence
Probability that i wins = e¤ort X i total expense X A + X B + X C ;
where i denotes A or B or C. For your information, the winning probability of every player will be displayed to you.
Therefore, each player's probability of winning depends not only on his or her own expenditure in the competition but also on the expenditures of the other players in the group. Note that the more Talers a player spends, the more likely it is that he or she wins the competition. More e¤ort expended, however, means that a player has to pay more Talers to the lab.
5. If none of the players expends any Taler, i.e., X A = X B = X C = 0 , then it is equally likely that A, or B;or C wins. If two players (e.g., A and B) both do not expend any Taler, but the third player (e.g., C) expends at least one Taler, the third player (i.e., C) wins the competition.
6. Every player has to pay e¤ort (in Taler) to the lab, irrespective of the outcome of the fortune wheel. Therefore, your earnings per round will be calculated as your gain in the competition minus your e¤ort: earnings=gain-e¤ort. The winning player gets the prize of 450 Taler and the losing players get nothing. The winning player's earnings = 450 X i , while the losing players'earnings= X i .
B.1.2 Procedure
The experiment will consist of 24 identical rounds. In each round, you will have the same role (player A, or B, or C). The other two players in your group will be randomly assigned to you in each round. You will not know who the other players in your group are. All the decisions A-4 you make will remain anonymous, and any attempt to reveal your identity to anyone is prohibited. After the experiment, you will be asked to answer some questions, including some personal information (e.g., gender, age, major...). All the information you provide will be kept anonymous and strictly con…dential. At the end of today's experiment, we will randomly choose 6 rounds out of 24 to pay you. Your total earnings in those 6 rounds will be added up, converted to euros, and paid to you in cash. This means that the earnings of all other rounds will not be paid to you and that you do not have to pay the e¤orts of these rounds either. You will get to know which 6 out of the 24 rounds will be chosen only after …nishing these 24 rounds. In addition to your earnings from these 6 selected rounds, you will receive 0.60 euros for each of the 24 rounds you have played.
Before the experiment starts, we will ask you some questions (which are related to the actions in the experiment) through the computer screen.
B.2 Arandom treatment
Welcome to this experiment! Please read these instructions carefully and completely. Properly understanding the instructions will help you to make better decisions and hence earn more money.
Your earnings in this experiment will be measured in Talers. At the end of the experiment we will convert the Talers you have earned to cash and pay you in private. For each 45 Talers you earn, you will be paid 1 Euro in cash. Therefore, the more Talers you earn, the more cash you will gain at the end of today's experiment. In addition to the Talers earned during the experiment, each participant will receive a show-up fee of 4 Euros.
A-5
B.2.1 Your task
This experiment will consist of 24 rounds. Before the actual experiment starts, you will …rst have to answer a few questions related to the experiment. The questions will be presented to you through the computer screen. For the experiment, groups consisting of three people are formed. These groups are randomly composed in each round. Your task in each round is to make some decisions. The money you earn depends on your decision and the decisions of the two other players in your group.
Let the three players in one group be called A, B, and C. In each round, three players A, B, and C compete for a prize of 450 Talers. The competition works as follows:
1. Two players A and B form an "alliance". Player C is playing on his or her own.
2. Your role in the experiment will be that of player A, B, or C. This role will be randomly assigned to you. Each participant will keep his or her role throughout the entire experiment.
3. In a …rst stage, all players will simultaneously choose "an e¤ort level". Each player decides independently on his or her own e¤ort level. A player's e¤ort is chosen as an integer between 0 and 250, and it corresponds to the amount of Talers the player would like to expend in the competition to win the prize. You will have to pay this amount of Talers to the lab, whether or not you win the competition. In the following, player A's e¤ort is denoted by X A , player B's e¤ort is denoted by X B , and similarly player C's e¤ort is denoted by X C .
4. Then, you will be shown the amount of Talers that the other players in your group have expended. The e¤orts of player A and B will be added up, and the sum of X A and X B corresponds to the e¤ort that the alliance of players A and B spends on the competition. The total expense is equal to the sum of all players'e¤orts: X A + X B + X C .
A-6 5. Now a fortune wheel will turn and decide whether the alliance consisting of A and B or whether player C wins the 450-Taler-prize. As you will see, the fortune wheel is divided into two colors -red and blue. The red color represents the total Talers spent by players A and B (i.e., X A + X B ). The blue color represents the Talers spent by player C (i.e., X C ). The two colored areas on the wheel represent exactly their shares in the total expense (i.e., X A + X B + X C ).
6. At the centre of the fortune wheel there is an arrow initially pointing to the top. After some time the arrow starts to rotate and then stops randomly. If the arrow stops in the red-colored area, players A and B win the prize. If the arrow stops in the blue-colored area, player C wins the prize. This means that the probability that players A and B win the prize is equal to their share of their joint e¤ort in the total expense, hence probability that A and B win = e¤ort X A + e¤ort X B total expense X A + X B + X C :
Equivalently, the probability that player C wins the prize is equal to the share of C's e¤ort in the total expense:
probability that C wins = e¤ort X C total expense X A + X B + X C :
For your information, the probabilities that either the alliance of A and B or player C wins the competition will be displayed to you.
7. If none of the players expends any Taler, i.e., X A = X B = X C = 0 , then it is equally likely that either the alliance A and B or player C wins. If players A and B both do not expend any Taler, but player C expends at least one Taler, player C wins the competition. If player C does not expend A-7
any Taler, but either player A or player B (or both) expends at least one Taler, the alliance A and B wins the competition.
8. Every player has to pay e¤ort (in Taler) to the lab, irrespective of the outcome of the fortune wheel. Therefore, your earnings per round will be calculated as your gain in the competition minus your e¤ort: earnings=gain-e¤ort.
In case player C wins, the competition ends and he or she gets the 450-Taler-prize; players A and B will gain nothing. While players A and B do not have any gain, but have to pay their e¤orts, the earnings of player C are calculated as follows: C's earnings = 450 -X C . The earnings of player A or B are equal to X A or X B , respectively.
In case the alliance of A and B wins the competition, player C's earnings = -X C : One player out of the alliance will then be randomly drawn by the computer as the …nal winner for the 450-Taler-prize, whereas the other player gets nothing. The winning probability for this second random draw is again determined by the e¤orts contributed in the contest against player C.
probability that A wins = e¤ort X A total expense X A + X B :
probability that B wins = e¤ort X B total expense X A + X B :
Therefore, the earnings are 450 X A for player A and X B for player B if A wins; X A for player A and 450 X B for player B if B wins.
B.2.2 Procedure
The experiment will consist of 24 identical rounds. In each round, you will have the same role (player A, B, or C). The other two players in your group will be randomly assigned to you in each round. You will not know who the other players in your group are. All the decisions you make will remain anonymous, and any attempt to reveal your identity to anyone is prohibited. After the experiment, you will be asked to answer some A-8 questions, including some personal information (e.g., gender, age, major...). All the information you provide will be kept anonymous and strictly con…dential.
At the end of today's experiment, we will randomly choose 6 rounds out of 24 to pay you. Your total earnings in those 6 rounds will be added up, converted to euros, and paid to you in cash. This means that the earnings of all other rounds will not be paid to you and that you do not have to pay the e¤orts of these rounds either. You will get to know which 6 out of the 24 rounds will be chosen only after …nishing these 24 rounds. In addition to your earnings from these 6 selected rounds, you will receive 0.60 euros for each of the 24 rounds you have played .
B.3 Aproportion treatment
Your earnings in this experiment will be measured in Talers. At the end of the experiment we will convert the Talers you have earned to cash and pay you in private. For each 45 Talers you earn you will be paid 1 Euro in cash. Therefore, the more Talers you earn, the more cash you will gain at the end of today's experiment. In addition to the Talers earned during the experiment, each participant will receive a show-up fee of 4 Euros.
B.3.1 Your task
This experiment will consist of 24 rounds. Before the actual experiment starts, you will …rst have to answer a few questions related to the experiment. The questions will be presented to you through the computer screen. For the experiment, groups A-9 consisting of three people are formed. These groups are randomly composed in each round. Your task in each round is to make some decisions. The money you earn depends on your decision and the decisions of the two other players in your group.
5. Now a fortune wheel will turn and decide whether the alliance consisting of A and B or whether player C wins the 450-Taler-prize. As you will see, the fortune wheel is divided into two colors -red and blue. The red color represents the total Talers spent by player A and B (i.e., X A +X B ). The blue color represents the Talers spent by player C (i.e., X C ). The two colored A-10 areas on the wheel represent exactly their shares in the total expense (i.e., X A + X B + X C ).
7. If none of the players expends any Taler, i.e., X A = X B = X C = 0 , then it is equally likely that either the alliance A and B or player C wins. If players A and B both do not expend any Taler, but player C expends at least one Taler, player C wins the competition. If player C does not expend any Taler, but either player A or player B (or both) expends at least one Taler, the alliance A and B wins the competition.
8. Every player has to pay e¤ort (in Taler) to the lab, irrespective of the outcome of the fortune wheel. Therefore, your earnings per round will be calculated A-11 as your gain in the competition minus your e¤ort: earnings=gain-e¤ort.
In case the alliance of A and B wins the competition, then players A and B share the prize according to how much each player has expended in the contest against player C. Let S A and S B denote the share of 450-Thaler-prize entitled to player A and B, respectively: and player C's earnings = -X C .
B.3.2 Procedure
The experiment will consist of 24 identical rounds. In each round, you will have the same role (player A, B, or C). The other two players in your group will be randomly assigned to you in each round. You will not know who the other players in your group are. All the decisions you make will remain anonymous, and any attempt to reveal your identity to anyone is prohibited. After the experiment, you will be asked to answer some A-12 questions, including some personal information (e.g., gender, age, major...). All the information you provide will be kept anonymous and strictly con…dential.
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